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MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al. , 
Defendants/ 
Respondents. 
Case No- 20040 
APPELLANTS1 REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICATION AND RATIONALE UNDERLYING 
THE COMMON LAW IMMUNITY FOR "DISCRETIONARY" FUNCTIONS DEMONSTRATES 
THAT THE DISCRETIONARY WAIVER TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY SHOULD BE 
CONFINED TO THOSE BASIC DECISIONS AND ACTS OCCURRING AT THE 
"BASIC POLICY MAKING LEVEL AND NOT EXTENDED TO THOSE ACTS AND 
DECISIONS TAKING PLACE AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL." 
The discretionary function exception to the waiver of 
governmental immunity is based upon the principle of separation 
of powers rather than the rule of sovereign immunity. For this 
reason, it must be limited to actions where a coordinate branch 
of government is engaged in making basic policy decisions. 
This court recognized in Little v. Utah State Division 
of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), that: 
Where the responsibility for basic decisions has 
been committed to one of the branches of our 
tri-partite system of government, the courts have 
refrained from sitting in judgment of the propriety 
of those decisions. 
The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Owen 
v. The City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648 (1979), noted 
that the common law doctrine protecting the state from 
"discretionary decisions—was not grounded on the principle of 
sovereign immunity but on a concern for separation of powers." 
(Id., at 648) 
The Supreme Court in Owen further noted that for a 
court or jury in a tort suit to review the reasonableness of a 
municipality's judgment on matters of policy would "be an 
infringement upon the powers properly vested in a coordinate and 
co-equal branch of government." The U.S. Supreme Court cited 
the case of Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352 (1968), 
wherein that court stated "immunity for discretionary activities 
serves no purpose except to assure that courts refuse to pass 
judgment on policy decision in the providence of coordinate 
branches of government." The discretionary function exception 
to the waiver of governmental immunity must therefore be limited 
to those occasions when a coordinate branch of government is 
acting in its legislative or basic policy making levels. 
Finally, in Owen, the United States Supreme Court 
noted that many, if not all, of a municipality's activities 
would seem to involve at least some measure of discretion, but 
the courts in the United States had carved out an exception so 
that, while a municipality retained its immunity for decisions as 
to whether the public interest required acting in one manner or 
another, once any particular decision was made, the city was 
fully liable for any injuries incurred in the execution of its 
judgment. 
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An understanding of the rationale underlying the common 
law immunity for discretionary functions explains why that doctrine 
cannot serve as a foundation for governmental immunity in the 
case at bar. In their complaint, the appellants basically claim 
that the respondents breached their duty to the appellant class 
when the respondents failed to make certain statutorily required 
inspections of Grove Finance Company. The Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions is part of the executive branch of government 
in the State of Utah. The Utah State Legislature, and not the 
Department of Financial Institutions, in §7-3-3 U.C.A., determined 
which financial institutions came under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Financial Institutions. The legislature, in §7-1-8 
U.C.A., set the policy requiring the Commissioner of the Department 
of Financial Institutions to examine certain financial institutions 
at least once a year. The same statute set forth in great detail 
exactly which institutions were to be examined and the manner 
and extent of the examination. Section 7-1-8, Utah Code 
Ann, provides as follows: 
The bank commissioner, or an examiner, shall 
visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every 
loan and trust corporation, every building and 
loan association, every industrial loan company, 
every small loan business, every cooperative 
bank, at least once a year. At every such 
examination, careful inquiry shall be made as to 
the condition and resources of each institution 
examined, the mode of conducting and managing its 
affairs, the official actions of its directors 
and officers, the investment and disposition of 
its funds, the security afforded its members, if 
any, and to those by whom its engagement are 
held, whether or not it is violating any provisions 
of law regarding to corporations or to the business 
of the institution examined, whether or not it is 
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complying with its articles of incorporation and 
bylaws, and as to such other matters as the 
commissioner may prescribe• 
The respondents have claimed that this statute does 
not apply to Grove Finance Company. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 35-43) 
In its memorandum decision in this case, the Third District 
Court refused to rule what statutory standard applied in this case 
(R. 963) and that matter is not before the court in this appeal. 
The appellants, however, have alleged in their complaints that 
this statute does apply and this court should accept that as the 
fact in determining whether the state is immune from suit pursuant 
to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
It is clear, however, that it is totally proper for the 
courts to determine whether or not agents of the executive branch 
have complied with statutory requirements placed upon them by 
the legislature. 
POINT II 
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION AS DEFINED BY THIS COURT 
LIMITS GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY TO THOSE DECISIONS AND ACTS OCCURRING 
AT THE BASIC POLICY MAKING LEVEL. 
In their brief, the respondents decry the "blanket 
test that discretionary immunity only applies to basic policy 
making decisions" (Respondent's Brief, p. 23). The fact of 
the matter, however, is that this is precisely the standard 
which has been established by this court. 
In Carroll v. State Road Commission, this court recognized 
that almost all acts require some degree of discretion, and 
observed that "the exception to the waiver set forth in the 
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Governmental Immunity Act should be confined to those decisions 
and acts occurring at the basic policy making level and not 
extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the operational 
level." Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 
P.2d 888 (1972), Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
In Morrison v. Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553 
(1979), this court stated: 
A discretionary function has been defined by this 
court as one that requires a basic policy decision 
essential to the realization or accomplishment of 
some basic governmental policy, program or 
objective. Any decision which does not require 
the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, 
and expertise is not discretionary but operational 
and is not protected. 
Most recently, in Little v. State of Utah Division of 
Family Services, this court set forth a four-part test in deter-
mining whether an act or omission could be considered discretionary 
for the purposes of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Under 
this test: 
To be purely discretionary, an act by the state must 
be affirmed under four preliminary questions: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or 
decision necessarily involve a basic governmental 
policy, program or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the realization or accom-
plishment of that policy, program or objective as 
opposed to one which would not change the course 
or direction of the policy, program or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission or decision 
require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, 
judgment, and expertise on the part of the govern-
mental agency involved? 
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(4) Does the governmental agency involved 
possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, 
or lawful authority and duty to do or make the 
challenged act, omission, or decision? 
The appellants allege that the omissions of the 
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions complained 
of in appellants' complaints fails tests 3 and 4 listed above. 
A. THE OMMISSION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DID NOT REQUIRE THE EXERCISE OF BASIC 
POLICY EVALUATION, JUDGMENT OR EXPERTISE. 
In their complaints, the appellants allege that the 
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions and his 
agents failed to inspect Grove Finance Company as required by 
§7-1-8. As previously noted above, the basic policy evaluation 
and judgment was exercised by the state legislature in setting 
forth the specific institutions to be examined, requiring the 
commissioner to perform an annual examination, and in setting 
forth in detail the mode and manner of all examinations. A 
failure to perform this required examination cannot be held to 
require the exercise of basic policy evaluation. 
This exact issue was determined by the Missouri Supreme 
Court in State ex rel. Funk v. Turner, et al., 42 S.W. 2d 594 
(Mo. 1931), where the Missouri Supreme Court considered the 
responsibility of a bank examiner under a statute virtually 
identical to §7-1-8 U.C.A. In that case, the court stated as 
follows: 
The difficulty arises in the classification of 
the duties of the bank examiner, whether 
discretionary or ministerial. To solve this 
question, we must refer to §11 689 R.S.Mo. 1919. 
This section makes it mandatory that every bank 
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be examined at least once a year. Additional 
examinations may be made when deemed necessary in 
the judgment of the commissioner. The section 
further provides: "On every such examination 
inquiries shall be made as to the condition and 
resources of such corporation or banker, the mode 
of conducting and managing its affairs, the actions 
of its directors or trustees if a corporation, 
the investment of its funds, the safety and prudence 
of its management, the security afforded to those 
by whom its engagements are held, and whether the 
requirements of its charter and the law have been 
complied with in the administration of its affairs; 
and as to such other matters as the commissioner 
may prescribe . . . " By the provisions of this 
section, the commissioner must make at least one 
examination each year. This duty is not a discre-
tionary one, but is ministerial; he has no 
alternative or choice in the matter. The same 
section leaves it to the judgment of the commissioner 
to make additional examinations . . . We are 
also of the opinion that the section makes it a 
mandatory duty of the officer who conducts the 
examination, to inquire into the various matters 
set out in the statute. Since it is mandatory, 
it becomes a ministerial duty, the examiner must 
make the inquiry with reference to the various 
matters set forth in the statute. 
A hapnazard examination by an examiner into 
tne matters required by the statute is not 
sufficient. Where a statute requires an act to 
be done, it must be performed with reasonable 
degree of diligence, care and prudence. Failure 
to so perform that duty is in the law of negligence. 
Id.., at 598 (emphasis added). 
In determining that the acts of a bank examiner in 
performing an annual statutorily required examination were 
ministerial and not discretionary, the Missouri Supreme Court 
examined the terms of the statute which is virtually identical 
to §7-1-8 Utah Code Ann. Rather than following the Funk v. Turner 
cited above, the respondents, in their brief, would have this 
court follow Gormley v. State, 54 Ga. App. 843, 189 S.E. 288 
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(1936), which the respondents claim to be squarely on point. 
The Gormley case has a fact situation which is nearly identical 
to the case at bar in that the superintendent of banks failed to 
examine an institution because, in his opinion, it was not a 
bank and therefore not subject to his supervision. The plaintiff 
in that case lost her savings when it was discovered that the 
institution was insolvent and sued the superintendent for negligence 
in failing to examine the institution. In Gormley, the court 
decided that based on Georgia statutes, the banking commissioner 
was involved in a discretionary function in determining which 
corporations in the State of Georgia came within his jurisdiction 
as banking commissioner. Although factually this case appears 
to be on all fours with the case at bar, the Georgia statutes 
are quite different from the statutory scheme of the State of 
Utah. As pointed out in the case of Vickers v. Motte, 109 
Ga. App. 615, 137 S.E. 2d 77 (1964), the Georgia statutory scheme 
provided that the superintendent of banks was to annually make 
up a list of all banks subject to his jurisdiction. In another 
section of the same act, the term bank was defined as: 
Any monied corporation authorized to do named 
acts, which shall include incorporated banks, 
savings banks, banking companies, trust companies 
and other corporations doing a banking business 
and expressly excluding building and loan 
associations or other associations or corporations. 
Id., at 80. The banking commissioner of the State of Georgia 
therefore had different duties than those of the commissioner of 
financial institutions in Utah. The Georgia banking commissioner 
was to make up anually a list of those banks which he felt came 
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within his jurisdiction. Also, the Georgia statutes, in defining 
those businesses under the jurisdiction of the banking supervisor, 
allowed some exceptions. Therefore, the Georgia banking 
superintendent had to exercise his judgment in determining whether 
an institution was a bank or fell within the exception. To the 
contrary, §7-3-3 of the Utah Code is clear and specific in its 
application and has no statutory exceptions. Clearly, what 
Gormley establishes is that whether a duty of a public official 
is mandatory or discretionary depends upon the language of the 
statutes imposing the duty upon the public official. Appellants 
submit that the case of Funk v. Turner which interprets a nearly 
identical statute to that of the State of Utah should carry more 
weight than Gormley v. State which interprets an entirely different 
statutory scheme. 
B. THE COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS WAS NOT STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TO VIOLATE THE LAW. 
Further, the appellants claim that the governmental 
agency did not possess the requisite statutory authority to make 
the challenged omission. A state employee has no "discretion" 
to violate state law. Its dictates upon the state employee are, 
absolute and imperative. When a court passes judgment on whether 
a state employee has complied with state law, it does not seek 
to second guess the reasonableness of the employee's decision 
nor interfere with the coordinate branch of government's resolution 
of competing policy considerations. Rather, it looks only to 
whether the state employee has conformed to the requirements of 
the state statutes. This same result was reached in Owen v. City 
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of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1979), which held that a 
city was not immune from suit under the discretionary function 
exception where the city had violated Federal statutes and the 
U.S. Constitution. 
To hold that the respondents in this case are shielded 
by the discretionary exception to the waiver of governmental 
immunity would be to hold that a state employee has the "discretion" 
to violate state law. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT EXPAND THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY. 
The respondents, in their brief, seek to have the 
court expand the principle of governmental immunity to cover all 
regulatory activities of state government. On page 15 of their 
brief, respondents cite United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 
U.S. , 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984), for the proposition that: 
Whatever else the discretionary function exception 
may include, it plainly was intended to encompass 
the discretionary acts of the government in acting 
in its role as a regulator of the conduct of 
private individuals. Time and again the legislative 
history refers to the acts of regulatory agencies 
as examples of those covered by the exception . . . 
Respondents have reviewed all of the cases rendered by 
this court concerning the discretionary exception to the waiver 
of governmental immunity and this court has never extended the 
discretionary function to encompass all regulatory functions of 
state government. In support of this position, the respondents 
cite Dalehite v. United States, 364 U.S. 15 (1953), which held 
that the United States was immune from suit on a decision to 
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implement a fertilizer export program notwithstanding its failure 
to determine the fertilizer's explosive capability. In that 
case, the court stated that the "discretionary function": 
Includes more than the initiation of programs and 
activities. It also includes the determinations 
made by executives or administrators in establishing 
plans, specifications or schedules of operations. 
Note how the Dalehite decision runs exactly contrary 
to the decision of this court in Andress v. State, 541 P.2d 117 
(Utah 1975), where this court determined that: 
The decision to build the highway and specifying 
its general location were discretionary functions, 
but the preparing of plans and specifications and 
the supervision of the manner in which the work 
was carried out cannot be labeled as discretionary 
functions. (Id., at 1120) 
Rather than following the lead of the Dalehite case, this court 
has consistently drawn the line between those functions ascribable 
to the policy making level and those ascribable to the operational 
level. (Little v. State Division of Family Services, supra.) 
The United States Supreme Court, in a footnote to its 
opinion in Owen v. City of Independence, supra., noted that: 
In this country, the sovereign or governmental 
immunity doctrine holding that the state, its 
subdivisions and municipal entities may not be 
held liable for tortious acts, was never completely 
accepted by the courts, its underlying principle 
being deemed contrary to the basic concept of the 
law of torts that liability follows negligence, 
as well as foreign to the spirit of the constitu-
tional guarantee that every person is entitled to 
a legal remedy for injuries he may receive in his 
person or property. As a result, the trend of 
judicial decisions was always to restrict rather 
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than to expand the doctrine of the municipal 
immunity. (Note on pp. 645/ 646) 
The appellants submit that the analysis of the 
U.S. Supreme Court is correct; the concept of government immunity 
is contrary to basic principles upon which our society is founded, 
i.e., that liability follows negligence and that every person is 
entitled to a legal remedy for injuries to his person or property. 
It would be improper for this court to expand the concept of 
governmental immunity as the respondents argue to include all 
regulatory activities of the government whether or not such 
regulatory activities occur at the basic policy making level or 
at the operational level. 
POINT IV 
HOLDING THE STATE LIABLE FOR ITS NEGLIGENCE AND THAT 
OF ITS AGENTS WILL NOT MAKE THE STATE AN INSURER OF ALL DEPOSITS 
IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE STATE. 
In Respondent's Brief, respondents repeatedly warn the 
court that to hold the state liable for its negligence in this 
case would inevitably lead to the state becoming "an insurer or 
guarantor for every dollar invested in every financial 
institution." (Respondent's Brief, p. 26) This argument assumes, 
of course, that the state department of financial institutions 
is acting with such negligence in its regulation of the financial 
institutions of this state that in every case where a depositer 
loses his money, he will be able to establish that the state had 
a duty—that the duty was breached and that the breach was the 
proximate cause of his injury. 
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If the state is indeed acting with such negligence, 
perhaps it ought to be held liable for every dollar lost by a 
depositor. If the state is not acting with such negligence, 
then the respondents' argument is meaningless. 
Both the states of Arizona, in State v. Superior Court 
of Maricopa County, 123 Ariz. 324, 599 P.2d 777 (1979), and 
Illinois, in Teherepnin v. Franz, 570 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978), 
have allowed depositers in financial institutions to sue the 
state for its negligent inspection of those financial institutions. 
Since all the elements of negligence must be established, neither 
state has become an insurer or guarantor for every dollar invested 
in every financial institution nor has either state been forced 
into bankruptcy. 
POINT V 
THE FEDERAL CASES CITED BY RESPONDENTS, IN THEIR BRIEF, 
DO NOT SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THE CASE 
AT BAR. 
In Respondent's Brief, after noting that Utah's Govern-
mental Immunity Act was patterned after the Federal Tort Claims 
Act and noting that "this court has consistently applied a 
substantially identical standard as federal cases construing 
that act, and determining the meaning of 'discretionary function,1" 
the respondents claim that the "federal cases in which issue has 
arisen have unanimously held that regulation of financial 
institutions is a discretionary function under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, for which regulatory agencies are immune from suit." 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 10-11) A close examination of the 
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federal cases cited by respondents in their brief, clearly show 
that the cases cited do not deal with the issues set forth in 
the case at bar and do not support the respondents' position. 
In Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1980), the 
Seventh Circuit Court, rather than applying a blanket conclusion 
that the government is immune from all suits concerning the 
regulation of financial institutions, specifically considered 
the distinction between policy and planning as opposed to the 
operational level. In this regard, the court stated as follows: 
This policy or planning as opposed to the operational 
level distinction has served as the primary test 
for applicability of §2680(a) since Dalehite. . . 
The existence of a discretionary function, and 
thus the potential for governmental liability 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ultimately 
rests upon the characterization of the challenged 
behavior as "policy" or "operations." 
Further, the court in Emch specifically recognized 
that there may be times when federal agencies charged with the 
regulation of banking institutions would be liable for losses of 
the financial institutions if the negligence occurred at the 
operational level on the part of the federal agencies. In 
re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 445 F. Supp. 723 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) stands as an example of federal agencies acting 
on the operational level in regulating financial institutions 
and therefore being liable for their negligence. It should be 
further noted that the issue in Emch was not a failure to examine 
as in the case at bar, but rather a complaint against the government 
for committing numerous mistakes, errors and omissions in the 
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course of the bank examination. Such is clearly not the issue 
in the case at bar. 
In First Savings and Loan Association v. First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, 531 F. Supp. 251 (1961), cited by 
the respondents in their brief on pages 13 and 34, an action was 
brought by First Savings and Loan Association alleging that 
First Federal Savings and Loan Association had acted in concert 
with the government to place First Savings and Loan Association 
in receivorship and sell its assets. This was a claim for an 
intentional tort and is not in any way similar in the case at 
bar. 
In First Savings and Loan Association v. First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association of Hawaii, 542 F. Supp. 988 (1982), 
the plaintiffs' claim was dismissed due to the failure of the 
plaintiffs to file a claim with a federal agency within two 
years from the time the claim first accrued. Again, this action 
cited by the respondents on page 13 of their brief has no relevance 
to any of the issues before the court in the case at bar. 
In Magellsen v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 341 
F. Supp. 1031 (1972), cited by respondents on page 13 of their 
brief, an action was brought against the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corp. for failure to act upon an application for insurance and 
for discrimination against the individual who had submitted the 
application. This case also bears no similarity to any of the 
issues presented in the case at bar. 
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In Davis v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 369 F. Supp 
277 (1974), an action was brought against the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp. for the failure to disclose to the public the 
insolvency of a particular bank. In that case, the court held 
that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. had no duty to disclose 
the insolvency to the general public. Davis would be relevant 
to the case at bar if the appellants, as claimed by the respondents 
on page 33 of their brief, were making a claim against the 
Department of Financial Institutions for failing to disclose the 
insolvency of the bank. In making this claim, the respondents 
are merely setting up a straw man so that they can knock it down 
again. The appellants have made it clear in their pleadings and 
in the record that they make no such claim. (R., at 665 and 
666) Rather, the point being made by the appellants is that, 
after issuing the cease and desist order prohibiting Grove Finance 
from accepting additional monies on deposit, the defendants 
totally failed to enforce such order to the damage and detriment 
of the appellants. 
I n
 Huntington Towers Ltd. v. Franklin National Bank, 
559 F.2d 863 (1977), rather than merely adopting the position 
urged by respondent in this case that all government regulation 
of banking institutions is per se a discretionary activity, the 
court in Huntington Towers did exactly what the appellants in 
this case are asking this court to do; i.e., it reviewed the 
language of the statute to determine if the act complained of 
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was discretionary or ministerial. In the Huntington Towers 
case, the complaints against the comptroller were as follows: 
(1) He failed to declare an insolvent bank 
solvent; 
(2) He declared an insolvent bank solvent; 
(3) He kept an insolvent bank; 
(4) He consented to an unlawful preference 
among creditors in violation of 12 U.S.C. §194; and 
(5) He failed he failed to take action to 
have those preferred liens declared null and avoid. 
Again, this case raises none of the issues presented 
to this court in the case at bar. 
Finally, in Dannhausen v. First National Bank of Sturgeon 
Bay, 538 F. Supp. 551 (1982), the opinion of the court does 
contain dicta that 28 U.S.C. §2680(a) precludes suits againt the 
United States involved in the regulation and examination of 
banks. Although this language appears in dicta, again the issues 
in the Dannhausen case are not even vaguely similar to the issues 
set forth in the case at bar. In Dannhausen, the issue was 
whether the comptroller could be held liable for his refusal to 
give information to the plaintiffs concerning the results of a 
bank examination. 
A close examination of the federal cases, which 
respondents claim unanimously hold that the governmental regulation 
of financial institutions is per se discretionary, fails to 
support the respondents' point. None of the cases deal directly 
with the issues presented to the court in the case at bar. 
Further, the Emch case primarily relied upon by the respondents 
specifically distinguishes between those acts performed at the 
policy making level and those made at the operational level. 
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POINT VI 
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL TO DETERMINE 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE. 
Respondents, in their brief, stated that "the respondents 
agree with some of the facts set forth in the appellants1 statement 
of facts, but controvert others . . . " (Respondents' Brief, p. 
2) The respondents then went on to set forth their version of 
the facts, many of which the appellants strenuously disagree with. 
For example, on page 43 of the Appellants' Brief, 
appellants stated "The record now before the court attests that 
Grove Finance complied with all reporting requirements both as a 
small loan business and as a supervised lender, and that 
examinations by the Department of Financial Institutions indicated 
no U.C.C.C. violations, prior to the issuance of the cease and 
desist order in 1980." Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Rather, the appellants, in their motion for summary judgment, 
demonstrated to the court numerous violations of the U.C.C.C. 
reporting requirements by Grove Finance Company which the Department 
of Financial Institutions either knew or should have known of. 
(R. 953, 954, 955) 
In a case such as this where the facts are disputed, 
it is appropriate for the appellants to be allowed a trial so 
that the facts can be determined by the court. Such a deter-
mination of the facts, however, is not necessary for this court 
to determine whether the respondents are immune from suit under 
the principles of governmental immunity. Rather, this court 
should consider the complaints of the plaintiffs-appellants and 
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the allegations contained therein should be taken as true in 
determining whether the state is immune from suit pursuant to 
the principles of governmental immunity, 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the rationale underlying the common 
law immunity for "discretionary functions" demonstrates that 
this exception to the waiver of governmental immunity is based 
upon the doctrine of separation of powers rather than the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity. For this reason, the discretionary function 
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity should be confined 
strictly to those decisions and acts occurring at the basic 
policy making level and not extended to those acts and decisions 
taking place at the operational level. This court has followed 
the federal courts in making the distinction between the basic 
policy making level and the operational level. However, to hold 
that the respondents in this case are shielded by the discretionary 
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity would be to 
hold that a state employee has the "discretion" to violate the law. 
This court has been asked by the respondents to extend 
the doctrine of governmental immunity to cover all cases where 
the government is performing a regulatory function whether or 
not it is performing on the basic policy making level or on the 
operational level. Since the concept of governmental immunity 
goes directly contrary to the well-established principles that 
liability follows negligence and the constitutional guarantee 
that every person is entitled to a legal remedy for injuries he 
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may receive in his person or property, this court should decline 
to extend the doctrine of governmental immunity as requested by 
the respondents. 
The appellants respectfully request that the court 
overrule the decision of the Third District Court holding the 
respondents immune from suit and allow this matter to proceed 
forward to trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of January, 1985. 
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